

LOUIS HARTZ'S CONCEPT OF THE FRAGMENT SOCIETY AND ITS APPLICATIONS TO CANADA

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This paper has a double purpose. First, I wish to describe very briefly Louis Hartz's theory of the ideological formation of colonial societies and the intellectual setting out of which it emerged in the 1950's. Secondly, and rather more extensively, I should like to trace the different applications of this theory in Canada, and particularly in English Canada, by several scholars who have applied it in rather different ways, and with somewhat divergent interpretations and conclusions, to the Canadian setting.

At the start, one comment on the Canadian background is perhaps in order. I suggest that one can distinguish three major approaches to the interpretation of Canadian society in the historiographical tradition of English Canada. First - in both chronology and depth of scholarship - there have been economic interpretations, as represented by the work of Innis, Macintosh, Creighton, and others. Behind them one finds the tradition of the Toronto school of economic historians of the 1890's and the work of Adam Shortt at Queen's during the same period. A second category embraces various environmental interpretations, ranging from theories of the superiority of the Northerly races and the salubrious effects of northerly climates in the late nineteenth century to the considerable impact of Turner's frontier theory between the two World Wars. Maurice Careless's theory of metropolitanism, and more general applications of the centre-periphery concept, can be seen in one sense as reactions to frontier theory which remain within the same framework. A third approach may be broadly categorized as cultural interpretations, which place primary emphasis upon the cultural inheritance imported in the process of settlement. Developed arguments of this type are perhaps found less frequently, though Arthur Lower's 1943 presidential address to the Canadian Historical Association, "Two Ways of Life", is a notable example. The Hartzian fragment concept, I would argue, falls clearly in this third category, and part of the attraction that it has exerted for scholars during the past decade has perhaps been due to the relative absence of other, competing cultural explanations.

I – THE CONCEPT OF THE FRAGMENT

For the background to fragment theory, one must go back to an earlier book of Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, published in 1955. This brilliant interpretive essay, which was soon recognized as a classic of American thought, arose from a question posed by the McCarthy period, namely, how could America be simultaneously "liberal" and intolerant? Hartz found the answer to this paradox (which might indeed seem less perplexing in the 1960's) in the universalism of American liberalism. In the American setting, liberalism faced no rival ideologies, no ideological struggles. The political cleavage structure had developed *within* the limits of the liberal tradition. The ideological firmament was characterized by the pervasiveness of John Locke and to be non-liberal was to be also un-American. Even the American South, Hartz contended, was characterized - though imperfectly - by the liberal heritage, and this point he seeks to demonstrate through an analysis of the artificiality and contradictions of the doctrines of Southern "feudalism" developed as a defence of slavery. Thus for Hartz the American tradition is ideologically uniform in spite of any differences in the colonial heritage and the North-South conflicts of the nineteenth century.

What stands out in *The Liberal Tradition in America* is its emphasis on the uniqueness of the American tradition. Within a few years, however, Hartz had begun to reflect on the comparative development of other societies that were products of European settlement. In this he was prompted by an article written by one of his students on the experience of Australia (1). By 1960 he had conceived of a study of the comparative experience of several colonial societies and the elaboration of a more general theory of the fate of ideologies in the history of European expansion. In early January 1961 the five future contributors to *The Founding of New Societies* met for a few days in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to discuss Hartz's ideas and to plan a more or less common approach to an agreed range of questions. It was an historic moment to be in Cambridge. The Kennedy administration was just being formed, and each day brought news of more Harvard faculty members being drawn to Washington. In the year following this meeting, the essays on individual countries were written, and Hartz himself began to shape the theoretical chapters of the book that was published in 1964 under the rather lengthy title: *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia*. An idea that had begun in 1955 as a manifestation of American uniqueness was thus transformed into a general theory applicable to all societies formed through the implantation of European colonial settlements.

The basic argument of *The Founding of New Societies* can be summarized briefly. Hartz sees each case of colonization through settlement as a process of fragmentation, as a separation of a colonial part from the European whole, as an isolation of a specific slice or portion of European society endowed with particular ideological characteristics and tendencies. In the case of the United States, Australia, or Latin America, the resulting colonial societies represented in each case a single ideological tradition, but Canada and South Africa, because of the composite nature of their founding traditions, are seen as dual-fragment societies.

In the New World setting, these parts or fragments of the original European ideological spectrum become totalities, wholes, absolutes, universes in their own right. Rigidity and traditionalism set in. There is a strong tendency to a hardening or fixity of fragment values. But the situation is also complex, for there is freedom to evolve in the new setting without fear of encroachment from other ideologies. As a consequence, fragment societies are characterized by ideological monopoly, and by a drying up of the dialectical processes that have created continuing tensions in European political debate. In the fragment societies, fundamental social theorizing ceases, because the basic enemies have been left behind in Europe and the battles won by default. Empirically, Hartz discerns an absence of significant social philosophy in all fragment societies, and in a characteristic passage he offers an explanation :

What smothered philosophy in the fragment cultures was the false certainty that those cultures created for themselves. The whole mechanism of their past development can be viewed in terms of the drive for this certainty : the destruction of the past, the shutting off of the future, the interior unfolding, above all the psychic metamorphoses associated with the whole process (2).

Hartz's theoretical framework does not stop, however, with the formation and hardening of the fragment. In the twentieth century the process changes once again. As the world becomes more unified in a technological sense, the isolation of the fragment cannot continue. The fragment cultures are increasingly forced to resume contact with the cultures they have left behind and to take cognizance once again of ideological pluralism. This process, Hartz maintains, creates strains, harsh intolerance, and painful readjustments, but it will go on necessarily as the reintegration of the fragment cultures into the global community continues. Hence the fragment experience can be seen as a finite phase in the development of the new societies from the expansion of Europe, though Hartz is not particularly explicit as to the consequences of the rediscovery of pluralism.

Before we turn to the application of these ideas to Canada, two observations are in order. First, Hartz himself classifies fragments into three broad categories, which he labels feudal (Latin America, French Canada), liberal (United States, English Canada, Dutch South Africa) and radical (Australia and English South Africa). Between the latter two categories there are no very sharp distinctions, and they share common egalitarian ideals. Sometimes he groups these two together as "Enlightenment" fragments, in contrast to the pre-modern or feudal type. Further, he does not deny significant shadings and differences from one overseas setting to another, but his main concern is to discover parallels between fragments of the same ideological family, for this is where the theory of the fragment can be expected to have the power to explain and clarify.

Secondly, Hartz observes that fragments seldom represent cases of "pure" ideology. The English-Canadian liberal fragment is "etched with a Tory streak coming out of the American Revolution", but there are also similar Tory elements in the American South and in South Africa arising from other causes, from "the elitism of racial biases". In Hartz's view this apparently does not increase the ideological breadth or range of these fragments, but merely defines their ideological coordinates more precisely. Such shadings among fragments apparently derive from the "individuality of the settings in which they evolve", and do not alter the broad tripartite classification of fragments as feudal, liberal, or radical (3).

II – APPLICATIONS TO CANADA

One could examine the implications of Hartz's theoretical framework at considerably greater length, but instead I propose to turn to some of the ways in which the theory has been applied in Canada. More precisely I shall try to summarize five attempts to apply fragment theory in a general way to Canada, with a view to examining the differences between them but also to addressing the more general question of identifying major ideological currents in Canada. The first of these, chronologically, was my own essay "The Structure of Canadian History", which appeared in *The Founding of New Societies* (4).

Briefly, this essay argued that Canada is a classic case of a dual-fragment society based on the colonizing experiences of both France and Britain. The French-Canadian fragment, it suggested, was characterized by royal authority, centralized control, seigneurial land tenures, religious homogeneity and a Gallican Church. It was, however, tempered by a frontier environment, which led to a certain necessary mildness of control, and by limits imposed by physical distance from the metropolis.

It was not, in my opinion, quite so "feudal" as Hartz represents it to be, but rather more centralized, authoritarian, rationalist, absolutist (in the seventeenth-century sense), and to a degree mercantilist. The essay argued for strong tendencies to ideological persistence despite various external challenges and - since it was written in 1961 - it did not attempt a serious analysis of the changes that followed the death of Premier Duplessis in 1959.

The central feature of the English-Canadian tradition, the essay argued, was its foundation in Lockean liberalism. In stressing this point, I was reacting against what appeared to be the then prevailing view of the American Loyalists as unregenerate Tories. Basically, I argued, and despite some appearances to the contrary, the bulk of the Loyalists in British North America were predominantly Lockean and liberal, as was the society they had left behind, and contact with French Canada only reinforced the awareness of this liberalism. Further, the essay suggested, the great post-Napoleonic migration from the British Isles, with its compelling attractions of landed property and social equality, served to reinforce these liberal tendencies. Although the value system of English Canada was clearly rather slow to mature, I considered that this fragment was mature and fully formed in an ideological sense by about 1850, when the first wave of British immigration began to subside.

In hindsight, the essay was perhaps unnecessarily emphatic in making its case for the predominance of liberalism and of Locke, but the issue at the time was to identify the major thrust or direction of the English-Canadian tradition, and not to refine its details or to take a stand on issues that have been raised since. My belief was - and still is - that much of Canadian history has been distorted by being placed within an almost exclusively North American frame of reference, and by a tendency to magnify ideological distinctions between English Canada and the United States as a means of asserting a Canadian political identity. If these ideological differences are small, there is no need to inflate them, or to invent new ones, because political identity is not necessarily founded on ideological distinctiveness.

The second application of the Hartzian theory is that of Gad Horowitz. In an article published in 1966, and again with minor revisions in the introductory chapter to his *Canadian Labour in Politics* (5), Horowitz reviews meticulously the argument of the *Founding of New Societies* and proposes significant modifications. First, he suggests that the "Tory touch" noted by Hartz and McRae in the English-Canadian fragment is not negligible but significant in the Canadian setting. This "Tory touch" then opens the way to a correspondingly significant "socialist touch" through the operation of an apparently muted but nonetheless discernible European-style dialectic.

Secondly, Horowitz raises the question of the supposed date of congealment or fixity of fragment values, the point being that if this formative stage of fragment values lasted long enough, some further socialist influence could enter Canada directly in the stream of later British immigration. Horowitz concludes that the English-Canadian fragment, unlike the American, does contain a significant element of socialism, and of a strain different from that which failed to take root in the United States : "In Canada, socialism is British, non-Marxist, and worldly ; in the United States it is German, Marxist, and otherworldly" (6).

Horowitz's main point is to contest the *exclusiveness*, but not the *dominance*, of liberalism on the Canadian ideological stage. This position may be summarized clearly in his own words :

My argument is essentially that non-liberal British elements have entered into English-Canadian society *together* with American liberal elements at the foundations. The fact is that Canada has been greatly influenced by both the United States and Britain. This is not to deny that liberalism is the dominant element in the English-Canadian political culture ; it is to stress that it is not the sole element, that it is accompanied by vital and legitimate streams of toryism and socialism which have as close a relation to English Canada's "essence" or "foundations" as does liberalism. English Canada's "essence" is both liberal and non-liberal (7).

Another innovation introduced by Horowitz is to shift the focus of the discussion from rather impressionistic material on mass attitudes to the behavior and strategy of political parties and political elites. At this level he shows that Canadian Liberals have behaved as a European-style centre party, with enemies on both the right and the left, while American Democrats have functioned basically as a party of the left. Further, Canada is the sole case where the liberal centre emerges victorious over the left and right (8). There can be no denying the essential correctness of these perceptions, but Horowitz does not stop to consider that federal politics involves both English and French Canada, and that the strategy of the Liberal Party in particular has reflected imperatives imposed by both fragments (9).

In sum, Horowitz's basic claim is that the Canadian political tradition is somehow broader in an ideological sense than its American counterpart, more pluralistic, though still predominantly liberal. While in the United States "Lockean monotheism reigned supreme", in British North American "Locke had to share his power with other deities" (10). Personally, I am inclined to agree with this conclusion, but

in developing an explanation I would place less emphasis on the idiosyncratic nature of the English-Canadian fragment and more on the simultaneous presence of two different fragments and their possible interrelationships, a question hitherto little explored by anyone who has utilized Hartzian concepts.

A third application of Hartzian theory to Canada may be found in the work of David Bell and Louis Balthazar, and particularly in a joint paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association in 1969 (11). Both authors have used the same framework in other writings, (12) but the joint paper will be used primarily here to illustrate their basic position. In this paper, Bell holds that the Tories of the American Revolution were no less Lockean than their Revolutionary compatriots, and the notion of a special "Tory touch" on the Loyalist side is substantially discounted. On the other hand, Balthazar presents the French-Canadian fragment as a purified example of *ancien régime* ideology, based on authority, hierarchy, and the absence of an authentic bourgeoisie (13).

At this point, however, an important theoretical modification is introduced. The authors suggest that fragments develop according to two criteria: 1) the cultural inheritance, which serves as a kind of "genetic code" determining the context of later cultural development, and 2) the impact of "formative events" in a society's history, which shape and determine the evolution of a fragment in much the same way that environment shapes the development of an individual (14). The authors therefore call for a "new perspective" on Canadian history based upon this synthesis of Hartzian fragment theory and the notion of "formative events" which they find in Martin Lipset's treatment of the American Revolution in *The First New Nation* (15). In the Canadian case, the specific formative events for the French and English fragments respectively are the British Conquest and the American Revolution accompanied by the exile to Canada of the defeated Loyalists.

To illustrate the significance of the Conquest on French Canada, Balthazar sketches the defensive transformation of the fragment's basic identity under British rule from anti-capitalist to anti-English to nationalist (16). The fate of the American Loyalists, according to Bell, is even stranger, for their expulsion from the only society that they knew also cut them off from the only ideological roots that they knew and so provoked a profound crisis of identity (17). In this view, the American Revolution was a catalyst that produced a new nation among the victors, but it also produced a traumatized non-nation for those who lost, and among these losers were those Loyalists who became founders of English Canada. It is not difficult to see a connection between these anguished beginnings and the continuing debate on English-Canadian identity in recent years.

The work of Balthazar and Bell raises at least two major questions for further reflection. The first concerns the concept of a "formative event". It is not made clear in their analysis why an event of a traumatic or cataclysmic nature should be different in kind from more prolonged or gradual environmental pressures. For example, is the British Conquest as an "event" more significant for French Canada than prolonged contact in a situation of minority status with another fragment and another ideology? Secondly, what are the implications of the "non-nationness" of English Canada? Although Bell makes a convincing case for understanding English Canada's lack of national identity, he does not seem to inquire into the implications of this "non-nationness" for fragment theory as such, or for the specific development of the English-Canadian fragment. It could be argued that if English Canada was at its foundation denied its American Lockean birthright, forced to invent a new non-American identity and institutionally linked with Britain for several decades after its foundation period, it may turn out to be a very imperfect example of a fragment society in the Hartzian sense.

My fourth example is not so much an application of Hartzian theory as a critique or rejection of it. I refer to the work of the historian S. F. Wise, who has published during the past decade a series of papers that have argued for the preponderance of conservative doctrines in English-Canadian nineteenth-century history (18). In his presidential address to the Canadian Historical Association in 1974, however, Wise turned explicitly to an analysis and critique of the Hartzian thesis and in doing so modified significantly some of his own earlier positions (19). Wise's ideas on the role and contribution of conservatism in Canada are worth separate study (20), but our emphasis here will be on his analysis of Hartzian ideas.

Wise's case against the application of fragment theory to the Canadian case may be summarized briefly. First, the cultural heritage of Europe in Canada was extremely varied, and fragment theory is too general and too universalistic to take account of high levels of cultural and ethnic variation both at the point of departure from Europe and at the local or regional level in British North America. Further, unlike the United States, British North America remained continuously linked with Europe and with its metropolis throughout the nineteenth century, so that the fragment - if we adopt a Hartzian perspective - "was never free to develop fully according to its own inner impulses" (21). In addition, the survival of cultural pluralism in Canada is better explained by an hypothesis of conservative ideology than of liberal ideology, for conservative political systems tend to integrate at the elite level, leaving the masses less penetrated by a unifying ideology (22).

Most important for present purposes, Wise makes a case for continuing ideological pluralism. The content of Loyalist ideology and of wider English-Canadian society in the nineteenth century, he argues, contained both liberal and conservative elements. British North America was a setting for clashing ideologies, a dialectical battleground. "The English Canadian style and character is not to be understood in terms of the consensus of a triumphant liberalism, but, out of its contradictory heritage, in terms of muted conservatism and ambivalent liberalism, of contradiction, paradox and complexity" (23).

Here we arrive at a central paradox in Wise's thought. If this last hypothesis of clashing liberal and conservative ideologies is difficult to reconcile with Hartz's basic concept of ideological uniformity in fragment societies, Wise's earlier studies on the dominance of conservatism in English-Canadian history are fully consistent with Hartz. The only difference is that these earlier studies would label the English-Canadian fragment as conservative rather than liberal, and if we interpret "conservative" as synonymous with a certain kind of whiggism, the difference between the early Wise and the early Hartzians is not so great as it might at first appear. When he comes to consider the Hartzian concepts specifically in the 1974 presidential address, however, he rejects several of Hartz's central postulates, and in doing so he also turns his back upon his own earlier arguments for the predominance of the conservative ideology in shaping English-Canadian society.

A fifth application of Hartzian ideas occurs in a recent work of the sociologist Martin Lipset, who reassesses them in the course of a major comparative essay on the penetration of socialist ideology and socialist parties in the United States and Canada (24). His point of departure is the question: "Why no socialism in the U.S.?" and the companion issue as to why a socialist party had emerged successfully in Canada, a question which he himself had investigated as long ago as 1950 (25). In his 1976 paper Lipset approaches the question from two perspectives. First, he examines *societal differences* between Canada and the United States by means of an extensive review of recent social science literature, comparing writers who find significant differences with those - including Hartz - who have found basic similarities between the two countries. Secondly, he considers the role of *institutional differences*, particularly differences in electoral and party systems, as possible explanations of the differential success of socialist and social democratic movements.

Lipset concludes that in comparison with other western industrial societies the North American democracies both rank relatively low on the dimension of class consciousness and class conflict, and both show a relative weakness of the political

left. In this respect the social structures of English Canada and the United States are basically similar. The differences that arise in party systems and political behavior are to be explained more from differences in political institutions than from differences in basic societal structures. This conclusion is interesting, because it represents a reversal from Lipset's earlier writings and even from his assumptions when he began preparing the 1976 article.

In sum, Lipset concludes by concurring in the basic similarity of the English-Canadian and American fragment cultures as outlined in *The Founding of New Societies*, at least with respect to the issue that he is investigating, namely "the prospects for socialism and class solidarity" in the two countries. Because of the nature of the societies themselves, those prospects are limited in both countries by essentially similar fragment imperatives :

Since I began this exercise, biased in the other direction, I can enunciate these conclusions with the blessings of the ghost of Max Weber. He argued that scholars should mistrust all research results in harmony with their "party line", or the assumptions to which they were committed before they began research. I started with the assumption that the politically relevant cultures of Canada and the United States were different, and that this variation was reflected in their party systems, particularly the presence of a strong socialist party in one and not in the other. I conclude that the differences are much more in form than in content, a conclusion which also implies that the various critics of the American Socialist Party and the CCF/NDP who have argued that their failures stem from incorrect ideologies, strategies and tactics are wrong. They have failed because the complex North American environment has not been supportive for ideological and class-oriented politics narrower than those offered by brokerage coalition parties (26).

As will be evident by now, my concern in this paper has been primarily with applications of Hartzian concepts to the understanding of Canadian society in a broad or general sense, and so far these attempts have focussed primarily on English Canada or on English and French Canada together as a political system. Applications of Hartzian concepts to French Canada have so far tended to focus less on broad interpretations than on specific moments of French-Canadian history. As examples of this tendency one can mention Louis Balthazar's study of the political ideas of Louis-Joseph Papineau, already cited above (27), or André Bélanger's study of ideologies in Québec in the mid-1930's (28). Bélanger finds in the theory of the fragment an explanation of the *apolitisme* that he believes to be a common characteristic of the ideolo-

gies of the period, but he also discerns in the 1930's the first evidence of small fissures in the French-Canadian fragment which can be seen as precursors of an opening to liberalism and a rebirth of dialectic, after two centuries of quiescence, in the 1950's (29).

In relation to English Canada, the Hartzian thesis has stimulated a wide-ranging debate, which began with our concern in *The Founding of New Societies* to identify English-Canadian society as predominantly liberal and broadly parallel in ideological terms to American society. This position was challenged by Gad Horowitz, who in a delicately nuanced argument, constructed a halfway house to the original European dialectic, placing English Canada somewhere between the European model and the fragment model. With the 1969 paper of Bell and Balthazar there is a return to a simpler classification of fragments, but they also introduce a new emphasis on extraneous formative events as major influences on the development of the fragments. In this way they build a synthesis between cultural (or genetic) and environmental modes of explanation. S.F. Wise, whose earlier work is compatible with a Hartzian interpretation under a slightly different label, tends to reject this approach when he considers it explicitly, and instead sees English Canada as a reflection of continuing ideological contradiction rather than homogeneity. Finally Martin Lipset, departing from his own earlier writings, arrives at a reaffirmation of basic fragment similarities between English Canada and the United States, locating the source of divergences between them mainly in institutional differences. Lipset's 1976 paper is perhaps the most appropriate point at which to end this survey, because with it the ideological interpretations of English Canada have come full circle, returning close to the point of departure in 1964.

One final word, however, should be added. The Hartzian concept of the fragment will best serve its purpose if it generates not only continuing debate about fragment ideologies but also imaginative research that tests its hypotheses. To test the Hartzian hypotheses by empirical methods is admittedly difficult but by no means impossible. One illustration is a recent paper by Professors Soderlung, Nelson and Wagenberg, of the University of Windsor, which attempted to measure the validity of certain Hartzian hypotheses by a content analysis of the Confederation Debates of 1865 in the Province of Canada (30). If the findings of this test were not particularly supportive of Hartzian hypotheses of fragment development, one possible reason is that the Confederation Debates may not be a very good source for the study of general ideological orientations. Another example of empirical work is Professor Tom Truman's development of an attitude scale to measure the degree of toryism-conservatism among English-Canadian and American students (31). Even if early

results prove inconclusive, it is by work of this kind that the more general conceptual debate can be nourished, modified, and eventually opened up to the development of more refined hypotheses.

FOOTNOTES

1. *R.N. Rosecrance, "The Radical Tradition in Australia : An Interpretation", The Review of Politics, 22 (1960), pp. 115-132.*
2. *The Founding of New Societies, p. 65.*
3. *Ibid, p. 34.*
4. *New York : Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, pp. 219-274.*
5. *G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada : an interpretation", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science , p. 32 (1966), pp. 143-171, and Canadian Labour in Politics, Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1968, ch. 1.*
6. *Canadian Labour in Politics, p. 24.*
7. *Ibid., p. 19.*
8. *Ibid., pp. 29-44.*
9. *The hypotheses proposed by Horowitz could, of course, be tested further at the provincial level, where the influence of the French-Canadian fragment could be controlled, but so far this does not appear to have been seriously attempted.*
10. *Canadian Labour in Politics, p. 44.*
11. *D.V.J. Bell and L. Balthazar, "Nation and Non-Nation : Ideological Persistence in Canadian History : the Nineteenth Century" (paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto, June 1969).*

12. See also D.V.J. Bell, **Nation and Non-Nation : A New Analysis of the Loyalists of the American Revolution** (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Harvard University, 1969) ; "The Loyalist Tradition in Canada", **Journal of Canadian Studies**, vol. 5, no. 3 (1970), pp. 22-33 ; and L. Balthazar, **Les idées politiques de Louis-Joseph Papineau** (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Harvard University, 1970).
13. Bell and Balthazar, "Nation and Non-Nation", pp. 8-18.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5 .
15. *Ibid.*, p. 39 .
16. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25 .
18. See especially S.F. Wise and R.C. Brown, **Canada views the United States : Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes** (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 1967) ; "Upper Canada and the Conservative Tradition," in **Profiles of a Province : Studies in the History of Ontario**, Toronto : Ontario Historical Society, 1967 ; "God's Peculiar Peoples", in W.L. Morton, ed., **The Shield of Achilles**, Toronto : McClelland and Stewart, 1968 ; "Conservatism and Political Development : The Canadian Case", **South Atlantic Quarterly**, 69 (1970) pp. 226-243.
19. S.F. Wise, "Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground : some reflections on the Hartz Thesis", **Historical Papers of the Canadian Historical Association**, 1974, pp. 1-14.
20. For Wise's thought in general I have benefitted from an unpublished seminar paper by S.A. Scharf, "Studies in Ideological Development in British North America by S.F. Wise : A Critical Analysis".
21. "Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground", pp. 5-6.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11 .
23. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

24. S.M. Lipset, "*Radicalism in North America : a comparative view of the party systems in Canada and the United States*", **Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Fourth Series**, 14 (1976), pp. 19-55.
25. S.M. Lipset, **Agrarian Socialism : The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan**, Berkeley, 1950, and rev. ed. 1971.
26. Lipset, "*Radicalism in North America*", pp. 54-55 .
27. See note 12.
28. A.J. Bélanger, **L'Apolitisme des idéologies québécoises : le grand tournant de 1934 - 1936**, Québec : Les presses de l'université Laval, 1974.
29. **Ibid.**, pp. 336-368 .
30. W.C. Soderlund, R.C. Nelson, and R.H. Wagenberg, "*Canadian Confederation An Empirical Test of the Hartz Theory*" (paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting, Québec, 1976).
31. T. Truman, "*A scale for Measuring a Tory Streak in Canada and the United States*", **Canadian Journal of Political Science**, 10 (1977), pp. 597-614.